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Abstract
With the development of personalized and globalized technologies, a discussion regard-
ing how and why virtue epistemology should be an essential part of post-industrial 
 ethical analysis on augmented technologies and use of robotics in the global age becomes 
crucial. These globalized technologies in the form of either game apps (i.e., Pokémon Go) 
or robotics like drones become through the Internet multimedia a structural part of plan-
etary digitalization. While this development takes place, traditional virtue epistemology 
responds insufficiently to the devitalization of knowledge regarding manners (savoir vivre) 
and ways (savoir faire) of practicing and the need to respond to the sudden expansion of 
augmented games and drone use with personal and social intellect, responsibility, and 
consequently safety. The chapter intends to discuss this analysis in order to argue that a 
postindustrial epistemic reconfiguration of digital ethics is necessary, since augmented 
reality games and robotics are taking the form of massive trends for adults and nonadults, 
while for the first time, digital gaming and robot entertainment exceed the limits of the 
personal space and the virtual mode of the screen, moving out into the public realm, 
where reality is mixed with virtuality and human environment with unmanned robots.
Keywords: postindustrial, virtue epistemology, augmented reality, drones, globalized 
games
1. Introduction
Augmented reality (AR) digital games like Pokémon Go and robotic entertainment like drones 
redefine the ethical character of gaming in a public scale, since they become instantly popu-
lar and globalized by the IoT. In this sense and in terms of technology and entertainment, 
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being global means being digital [1], since this “game globalization” develops independently 
from the politics of globality, and consequently one can estimate that these practices will be 
enhanced, developing the future of digital entertainment. Hence, the question that the chap-
ter wishes to answer is whether it is possible to apply a virtue epistemology in the global 
expansion of digital games and robotic entertainment, in order to redefine the knowledge 
conditions of savoir vivre and savoir faire in terms of their use that will be practically depicted 
in the minimization of their personal and social side effects.
2. Expansion of augmented technologies and the epistemic gap  
between VR and empirical conduct
Pokémon Go [45] and relevant augmented technologies like Ingress [45] or Zombies Run [46] 
bring for the first time an active intersection between virtuality and the real world, by practic-
ing a virtual order in an empirical scale. As “Augmented,” we define the technological reality 
where “virtual content is overlaid into a user’s perspective of the world” [2]. During the sum-
mer of 2016, Pokémon Go gained a massive popularity in a world scale that showed everyone 
what does the term “globalized game” means. This sense of globalization reached a new level 
of authenticity that was different from the first arcade globalized video games like Pac‐Man 
[47] and Space‐Invaders [48]. Whereas the latter have been developed gradually from one coun-
try to the other within a decade, Pokémon Go has reached a level of global acceptance only 
within a month. This rapid expansion of augmented games is to a large extent the result of the 
progression of IoT and the digital transformation of video game industry’s way of thinking 
from local to global.
The credits for a free-to-play game whose purpose is to locate and capture virtual creatures 
along with the fact that Pokémon Go “has been suggested to improve public health by promot-
ing physical activity” [3] made it instantly popular. The “health benefit” idea that many aug-
mented mobile technologies offer is a decisive factor that differentiates their form of virtuality 
from traditional virtual reality (VR) game, which is static, leading to body inactivity: “now that 
many adults have a powerful and Internet-connected device always within reach in their pocket 
or handbag, the smartphone has become the ideal platform for short, sporadic, and flexible 
moments of video play” [4]. This shift from virtual passivity to virtual activity plays a central 
role in enhancing the user but at the same time brings for the first time in human history a 
practical and daily convergence and intersection between virtual and real environment. The 
Pokémon Go player chases virtual creatures in a real environment while at the same time other 
(nonvirtual) practices take place. The practice of the game, when it goes public, creates factual 
dangers not only for the player of the game but also for others, becoming thus a functional prob-
lem of ethical conduct (savoir vivre: knowledge of manners and savoir‐faire: knowledge of ways).
Hence, the main advantage of augmented reality games can be transformed, because of a 
lack of ethical conduct into their main disadvantage. By ethical conduct, one defines a set 
of rules, in the form of an ethical code, that will promote the values of the game (i.e., virtual 
values of the game), with respect to the already existing values (i.e., physical and social reality 
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values). In this section, I intend to show by using both actual and theoretical cases the side 
effects of the aforementioned intercrossing between virtuality and reality that outdoor use of 
augmented games may cause [5]. With 15,000,000 players behaving virtually in a real envi-
ronment worldwide, the number of car accidents in the USA reached 113,993 incidents in the 
first 10 days of its use, which were caused either by drivers’ or by pedestrians’ distraction [6]. 
Virtual distraction provided the chance for many robberies to succeed since the players/vic-
tims have been vulnerable to physical attacks. Furthermore, an increase has been noticed in 
trespassing on railway lines and in the road [6]. In addition to these, a recent research showed 
that “More than a quarter of players reported being likely or very likely to play the game 
while driving (27%), biking (43%), walking (without paying attention; 32%), and sacrificing 
sleep to play greater amounts of the game (38%)” [7].
Theoretically, the catalog of safety problems can be continued with the addition of all the 
possible incidents of disarrangements in daily life activities from walking to shopping distur-
bances and from riding a bike to drinking a coffee, but what is more important is that virtual 
distraction from the dangers of physical reality might lead even to potential kidnapping [8]. 
Even though the diversity of dangers can be endless from a quantitative point of view, in 
terms of their quality one can conclude that their character can be physical, legal, psychologi-
cal, and cognitive and that “mobile and mobile-augmented reality applications can promote 
distraction” [9], since Pokémon Go “is the first mass market app that fully transcends the 
virtual, the spatial, the social, and the physical” [10].
The epistemological inquiry underlines that in these activities a person behaves in an empiri-
cal environment, with real dangers and contingencies, in a virtual manner, establishing thus 
(a) an epistemological discontinuity (from physical to virtual) and (b) as a consequence of 
(a), an ethical disorientation [11]. According to Deleuze’s analysis of the relation between the 
virtual and the actual, these two modes of being create “a form of circuit” [12], where “the 
actual is the complement or the product, the object of actualization, which has nothing but 
the virtual as its subject” [12]. Hence, from an ontological perspective the virtual appears as a 
modal reality of the actual, but by describing the problems of virtual distraction in a physical 
environment one refers to two different understandings of actuality.
In the player’s hybrid actuality, the physical environment is a fact that is contiguous to the fact 
of the quest of a virtual creature, while for the non-players physical environment is a fact that 
is contiguous in their personal activities in a public space. However, there is a crucial differ-
ence among the players and the non-players which is that for the non-players there is nothing 
apart from themselves to distract them, whereas for the player there is a virtual component 
that (a) distraction is part of the game since they chase a virtual creature, (b) that this virtual 
creature is something other than themselves, and (c) that the responding activity of the soft-
ware during the game is totally unconnected from the other facts of the physical environment.
Thus, even if both groups perform something practical, the group of players develops a behav-
ior that after a certain point disconnects it from the environment it belongs both physically and 
socially since “they expand the game outside the traditional game space (the board or the screen) 
by merging physical and digital spaces” [13]. This is what causes an epistemological discontinu-
ity from physical to virtual, not because the game is not actual but because in order for the game 
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to proceed, a part of it (Pokémon’s “behavior”) remains unpredictable and thus totally discon-
nected from the physical environment of the public space. On that account, for the first time in 
human history we are dealing with a software game that energetically drives the player’s atten-
tion away from its physical and public environment, without any recognition of the changes or 
the possible dangers of the latter. This lack of detection can be verified not only in extreme cases 
like an earthquake, where the Pokémon will hide in the debris, but it becomes even more obvi-
ous through the daily frustration that it applies in human interaction leading often to accidents, 
serious or minors, and it is at this point where the epistemological discontinuity transforms into 
ethical disorientation, that is, a social mismanagement of the ethics of public sphere.
Ethical disorientation through augmented video games is not the product of a different under-
standing of ethics, nor is it part of an “augmenting situationist movement” revival through a 
downloadable alternative as some have discussed about AR games. What develops intrinsi-
cally between the game’s players and the non‐players is a virtue conflict. A virtue collision is 
between playing the game sufficiently in order to win using virtual manners in public on the 
one hand and be absorbed by daily life routine public ethics of savoir vivre and savoir faire on 
the other. What appears theoretically as an epistemological discontinuity continues practi-
cally as ethical disorientation in human interaction but ends up as a conflict between different 
virtue motives: “With Pokémon Go, locative game use behavior becomes a public event, a mat-
ter for public regulation. It becomes so recognizable as a reason to congregate in urban public 
places that it may become a resource for political demonstrations. In short, while most of the 
game-related mobility observable with Pokémon Go has already been observed before, the 
sheer commercial scale of the game turns such mobile behavior into a new kind of issue” [14]. 
Consequently, the most crucial aspect one examines in relation with global AR video games 
opens up as a problematization of virtue epistemology.
This becomes unavoidable after a certain point since the rapid expansion of technological 
evolution causes a virtual rearrangement of physical life as we knew it. Biomechanical struc-
tures, which are extensions of physical movements through mechanics, are substituted by 
intermediational processes, which are representational replications of reality through screens, 
where the virtual and the physical, that is, the digital and the analog, functionally intercross 
one another leading among other things to conversions of virtue motives that likewise ethi-
cally intercross between virtual and physical. Augmented reality video games are the first 
technologies that manage to globalize this intersection between physical and virtual since 
“AR enjoys clear advantages in comparison to the traditional VR. One of the key advantages 
gained by AR is having a better sense and interaction of reality whereas it lays emphasis on 
the organic integration of virtual environment and the real world” [15].
This means that in order to further explore these technological and ethical rearrangements, 
virtue ethics and virtue epistemology have to update their analytical character and involve 
further into subjects that deal with hypermodern virtue crossing between physical ethics and 
its already-established savoir vivre and savoir faire, and virtual or augmented games ethics—
“games that elicit physical activity have been called Active Video Games (AVG)” [16]—as 
well as with their apparent weakness to connect their virtue motives to physical environment.
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The very fact that pushes someone to distinguish between physical and virtual ethics is a 
consequence of epistemological inadequacy to formulate forms of “augmented” ethics that 
would sufficiently correspond in a problematization upon a technology that “bridges the gap 
between the real and the virtual in a seamless way” [17]. It is important in order to proceed 
epistemologically to understand the nature of this epistemic gap, between physical and vir-
tual or augmented reality. I will use as a basis of analysis a classical—in terms of ontological 
significance—and still current distinction between physical and social reality by John Searle. 
According to Searle, there is physical reality whose facts are measured by mathematical, 
physical, chemical, and biological factors, and there is social reality that even if arbitrary—
and by arbitrary Searle means constructed—it is constituted by social inventions that become 
factual through collective intentionality which represents for Searle “a biologically primi-
tive phenomenon that cannot be reduced to or eliminated in favor of something else” [18] 
like individual intention. Collective intentionality is based on social consent and the latter 
includes both ethical and virtue standards in relation to functional and consequently tech-
nological uses.
In other words, all forms of technology emerge in our daily life with the objective of becom-
ing functional and massively useful directly or indirectly. However, their functional character 
presumes a transformation or an adjustment of our collective intentionality by approving and 
expanding their use practically. According to many, it “is laudable that Pokémon Go encour-
ages players to become more active in walking and running whilst playing the game, which 
undeniably will contribute to the need for regular cardiovascular exercise in the fight against 
obesity. It also promotes exploring local areas and points of interest, which should be encour-
aged” [19]. This practical use either promotes new forms of ethics and virtues that correspond 
to the already existed, creating thus social consent, or collides with the established ethics and 
daily behavioral virtues, that is, savoir vivre and savoir faire, causing a turn of collective inten-
tionality away from it. Some examples of innovative technologies that failed to be bridged 
with the ethical standards of their time are Google glasses, nuclear weapons, e-books, virtual 
reality, or driverless cars. All these technologies have failed to be massively accepted for sev-
eral reasons and incompatibilities that were cognitive, practical, or even psychological, but 
in every case, they failed to create an ethological bridge with previous practices and forms of 
understanding.
Hence, the epistemic gap is the consequence produced by any cognitive act that becomes tech-
nologically operative, and while it transforms our empirical and perceptual aptitude, it mani-
fests itself by its difficulty to bridge technological operation to the ethology of the present in 
order to become functional. Technological inventions are artifacts by materials and scientific 
applications of physical reality which expand the latter, but in order to be functional they have 
to be absorbed practically by collective intentionality. Augmented reality video games are no 
exception from this ground, but by evolving in an interactive, public, and most importantly 
global manner, which at the same time diffuses augmented reality into fields such as education, 
professional training, and research activities, it is meaningful to seek through a hypermodern 
virtue epistemology for those elements that will couple physical and virtual components of an 
augmented ethos.
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3. Drone robotics, uncontrolled aviation, and virtue ethics
Drone robotics is an example of microtechnology machines that also for the first time trans-
forms social and ethical perception of airspace environment. Similarly with the case of AR 
video games, drone practicing especially through private ownership might have side effects 
that can end up highly problematic in terms of privacy violations both in public and in a domes-
tic environment through airspace. The drone fear regarding their private use affects the relation 
between civil airspace and ethics of everyday life to the extent that (a) civil airspace has not 
been occupied before by unmanned robots and (b) human ethics are based on biological fac-
tors of communication, perception, behaviors, and reactions that exclude aerial concentration.
The historical and practical codification of human terrestrially based ethical standards is 
expressed through the use of a corresponding savoir vivre and savoir faire, that is, knowledge 
of the codes of behavioral and communicational virtues that create a hierarchical but practical 
state, while avoiding chaos and social misconceptions in everyday life. Both knowledge of 
vivre (living in the existential sense) and knowledge of faire (social skills) are not simply codes 
of polite manners and aesthetic formations, which is their usual, however, superficial account, 
but they are active statements of order and functionality that use as their basis capacities of 
virtue. My argument will attempt to demonstrate that their virtue capacity is not only useful 
but also significant in a world that rapidly changes, and where social complexities multiply as 
new forms of activities and thus ethical frictions constantly emerge. This argument becomes 
evident when applied in the use of new technologies that is under private ownership and 
used in public, like micro‐robotics and specifically drone robotics.
Through the IoT, we experience an interface between physical and data reality where “drones 
represent a part of these “things” that collect, store and process large quantities of data that 
are then here to be acted upon” [20]. DIYers and hobbyists become increasingly fascinated 
with drones that become more and more affordable for personal use globally: “A generation 
is growing up with robotics as a part of its engineering DNA. It is only a matter of time before 
that generation shocks us with what it can do—and how cheaply” [21]. Notwithstanding, 
according to a recent US public poll “forty-two percent went as far as to oppose private own-
ership of drones, suggesting they prefer restricting them to officials or experts trained in safe 
operation” [22]. In addition to that “64 percent said they would not want their neighbor to 
have a drone” [22]. The reasons behind these hesitations are fear of snooping, violation of 
privacy, and anxiety regarding monitoring. Since private drone use is legal, and since it is 
impossible to recognize and distinguish whether a flying drone belongs to a company or to a 
citizen, a new era concerning the above ethical fears has begun.
It is inescapable thus that drone users, both private and companies, will blend into civil air-
space, with entertainment and commercial motives, respectively, and that without a previous 
code of ethical management, drone using will definitely confirm the ethical uneasiness of 
the public. First and foremost, drone offers to the user the power of invisible presence, that 
is, the ability to record and collect parts of physical reality from distance without being seen 
but through a “subjectless machine” [23]. Thereupon, if we consider that there is a behav-
ioral problem in a person that stumbles on others or in objects, while messaging in a mobile 
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phone, and if we conclude that there is something alarming when a person endangers his/her 
existence while chasing a nonexistent virtual creature, then to expect violations of privacy by 
drone civil use is a concomitant event since “drones are able to fly autonomously in different 
altitudes and they are usually equipped with sensors to monitor the environment and com-
munication units to exchange data with other drones or central stations” [24]. The common 
element in those three cases is that they all appear as massive technological trends that per-
vade anthropologically in daily culture.
It is obviously the beginning of a post‐industrial and global form of entertainment that differs 
a lot from the globalization of games such as skateboarding, rollers, or anything else that oper-
ates as an analog mechanism within the perceptional and restrictive limits of physical reality. 
Whereas in the case of AR games, one can object that during the game the fault about whatever 
may happen is strictly perceptional, hence the technology itself is secure, when it comes to 
drones, a recent research—which is the world’s first with regard to accidents with drones—
shows that there are technological defects that lead to operational misadventures: “Recently 
published in the journal Aerospace, the study found that in most cases, broken communications 
links between the pilot and the RPAS were the cause of the incident, leading the researchers to 
call for the introduction of commercial aircraft-type regulations to govern the communications 
systems” [25]. The study opens the question of responsibility in case of an accident regarding 
“Who (or what) is responsible? The drone itself? The designer of the drone? The officer who 
gave the order to deploy it? The commander in chief? Similar questions spring to mind in 
almost every application of autonomous robots we care to think of” [26].
While the study reveals that drone industry has to promote even more sufficient ways for solv-
ing safety and operational problems, the law regulation for drone use differs from one country 
to the other, whereas in many countries the regulations are inexplicit and in some others they do 
not even exist. Technology and experimentation are historically synonymous, and the myth of 
Daedalus and Icarus is an ancient narrative that appears as an account of a pioneering technol-
ogy that ends up in a tragedy. The account suggests that independently of the operational defi-
ciencies in any technology, it is always the human factor that supervises and ensures its safe use. 
In the case of drones, apart from the legal incongruity and the operational problems one should 
also consider their further booming through the convergence between their price decline and the 
growing fascination for a fast-developing technology that corresponds in a very wide category 
of usages beyond entertainment, from photography and mapping, to survey and cargo systems.
The lack of a general and common post-industrial legislation shows for once more that theory 
comes after practice and thus always behind time, but the most important thing displayed 
is again the lack of a universal attitude that exposes the epistemic gap between human ter-
restrial biology and the occupation of civil airspace by drones. Since human terrestriality is 
common and since civil airspace relates to it under the same biological limitations globally, 
then the legislation for drones ought and should be generalized and become a post-industrial 
ethotechnological matter‐of‐course, that is, a savoir vivre and a savoir faire for robotics. But in 
order for this to happen, a virtue epistemology should prepare the basis for the virtues upon 
which legislation will further develop into laws since virtue “is a synthesis in which the law 
loses its universality and the subject its particularity” [27].
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In other words, virtue is to be understood in the modern world as the “synthesis of personal 
character and the objective norms” [28]. Because when a legislation does not come under a 
set of virtues that connect intrinsically virtue and technology, then it progresses as prohibi-
tion or conformity that demands obedience or deference to a set of normative rules that as 
“technical” as they may be by setting different measures of distance from domestic areas from 
drones violations; they will never be able to reach neither the speed nor the magnetism that 
new entertainment technologies achieve either by mixing different modes of reality (respatial-
ization through AR) or by actualizing enterprises that humans are biologically unequipped 
to produce by their own means (respatialization through unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)).
Consequently, it follows that the virtues one seeks to promote for a post-industrial ethos 
should be able to connect the epistemic gap between historicity and functionality of virtues. 
In other words, one has to employ classical elements of virtuosity (citizen virtues imposed by 
society), and adjust them to modern or civic virtues (individual virtues exposed by the self), 
towards the practical needs of hypermodern freedom, where individuals create environments 
by the technical means of their time, like VR and AR, and understand their freedom by and 
through these technical objects (virtues of civic individuality disclosed in a digitally respatial-
ized environment: technoviduality). The latter explains the anthropological and cultural gap 
between an era where freedom was solely an event of dialogue and face-to-face communica-
tion from the current annexation of face-to-screen discursive reception and transmission.
Technovidual becomes a receiver of otherness and a presenter of itself through different media 
embodiments and the progressive globalization of IoT. Within post-industrial ethics, individuals 
acquire the opportunity (especially the younger generations) of receiving the social realm neither 
through imposition nor solely by physical communication but through different interconnected 
devices. This is why it is essential for the individual to understand these personalized mediums 
as foundational part of its current conditions of freedom. Machine becomes the new fellow being 
because the human fellow being is present as a respatialized extension of the machine, not only 
technically, as it was the case since the industrial revolution, but post-industrially as a person. 
But even in their political struggles for freedom, for example, the Arabic spring, people consider 
for the first time unarmed mobile machines to be their informational “comrades.”
From an epistemological point of view, humanity is passing from a transformative stage of its 
technical and thus environmental and communicational status into a new one where human 
presence becomes an issue of respatialization through technicity, but to the extent that this is 
a fact, then it follows that virtues, as part of presence, become also an object of respatializa-
tion processes. On that account, one may begin to acknowledge some basic public virtues 
as elements that civic technological use either in the case of AR or in the case of robotics can 
and should attempt to engage. A possible employment of a virtue like technological phronēsis 
(prudence), composed by supplementary character traits like technical euboulia (deliberation) 
or sunesis (sagacity), and intellectual skills like technical deinotes (cleverness) and technical 
gnomê (judgment), would be beneficial not only in terms of a dialogue between virtue epis-
temology and technological ethics but most importantly in the understanding of practicing 
these technologies with social responsibility and eagerness. In other words, a postindustrial 
virtue analogy would connect existence (vivre) and sociality (faire) with the global develop-
ment of digital culture and digital anthropology.
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4. Promoting virtue through epistemological analysis
To the extent that ethical problems become practical as I have shown in Sections 1 and 2, and 
based on the fact that augmented technologies and robotic engineering as globalized trends 
in entertainment will inevitably continue to develop, virtue epistemology has to address the 
problematic character of the discussed practices by focusing between the cognitive capabili-
ties of the augmented gamer or the drone user (reliabilist approach) and their corresponding 
intellectual traits (responsibilist approach). In this section, I develop an argument that will 
incorporate elements both of the reliabilist and of the responsibilist approach in order to show 
that both of them are equally important and interdependent for the development of a post-
industrial virtue approach toward the public use of AR and robotic technologies.
The distinction separating the reliabilist and the responsibilist approach consists in two different 
classes of cognitive and intellectual traits correspondingly that provide a person with the ability 
to qualify intellectually and/or as a character: “‘Virtue responsibilists’ conceive of intellectual 
virtues as the intellectual counterpart of moral virtues. These include traits like fairmindedness, 
open-mindedness, intellectual carefulness, intellectual courage and the like. ‘Virtue reliabilists’ 
conceive of intellectual virtues as any reliable or truth-conducive quality of a person. They 
cite as paradigm cases of intellectual virtue certain cognitive faculties or abilities like vision, 
memory, introspection and reason” [29]. I further argue by using four Aristotelian “secondary” 
virtues like euboulia (deliberation), sunesis (sagacity), deinotis (cleverness), and gnomê (judgment) 
that it is possible to formulate a postindustrial phronēsis whose target would be to
a. bridge the epistemic gap between spatialized and respatialized realities in terms of social 
responsibility and public rights (e.g., physical and virtual in the case of AR, or terrestrial 
and aerial in the case of drones);
b. provide the ground for a psychologically safe and easy-going approach of practicing tech-
nological entertainment;
c. ensure responsibility without minimizing the skill competition and the enthusiasm for 
these technologies; and
d. refresh and regenerate the importance of savoir vivre and faire in the digital era as a guaran-
tee of technical intellect based on virtue (both moral and cognitive).
Since we deal with problems that are first and foremost practical and it is through their 
social practicability that they become ethical, and since the reasons of our inquiry deal with 
public and consequently civic virtues, the aim of the chapter is not to isolate the knowledge 
of the good from practicing the good, which corresponds to the Aristotelian notion that “the 
science of the human good is politics” [30] and in particular social policy regarding public 
games and robotics. However, a postindustrial social policy of this kind should not be framed 
upon a plan that connects policy with the exercise of a corresponding law wherever the latter 
exists or whatever it may concern, but with the exercise of policy based on virtues. The main 
problem with law or legal pressure for safety reasons regarding personalized technologies 
and micro-/nanorobotics like AR games and drones is that their mobility along with their 
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increasing effectiveness regarding respatialization makes legal intervention a complicated 
and insufficient tool, from both a regulative and an operational point of view, which as expe-
rience from other cases shows, when it cannot intervene drastically, it becomes more disci-
plinarian and prohibitive.
According to Bent Flyvbjerg, it is possible to connect virtues such as phronēsis to contempo-
rary social policies, since “Aristotle saw not only as the necessary basis for social and politi-
cal inquiry, but as the most important of the intellectual virtues. Phronēsis is most important 
because it is that activity by which instrumental rationality is balanced by value-rationality, 
and because such balancing is crucial to the sustained happiness of the citizens in any society” 
[31]. Phronēsis in a post-industrial context is the virtue that is able to intellectually connect 
the epistemic gap caused by technological inventions to the problems caused by the users of 
these technologies, that is, between episteme and techne. In particular, by using four supple-
mentary virtues, like euboulia (deliberation), sunesis (sagacity), deinotis (cleverness), and gnomê 
(judgment), I will explain why they can sufficiently correlate with the four targeted proposi-
tions of a postindustrial virtue epistemology. The first two of these intellectual virtues can be 
described as assimilative in their characteristics, whereas the other two as enterprising. By 
assimilative, I mean that character-trait virtues like deliberation and sagacity have absorp-
tive capacities that contribute in the closing of the gap between episteme and techne, whereas 
by enterprising, intellectual virtues like cleverness and judgment innovate these new fields 
to move beyond the gap by organizing the ways through which these practices will remain 
exciting while prudent and sensational while safe.
Both deliberation and sagacity are virtues that inherently act as filters in that they process 
thinking in order for someone to arrive at a conclusion or take a decision: “Aristotle thinks 
that deliberation is the principal manifestation of the practical effectiveness of intelligence” 
[32]. Deliberation (euboulia) in the context of a post-industrial phronēsis regarding AR games 
and drone use in public means to think, and carefully decide about the ways through which 
a technological entertainment practice may or may not cause discontinuities in the function 
of public life. Public function is based on a set of globalized social rules, which are empiri-
cally tested and verified as appropriate and legitimate, and they include safety of the others 
and ourselves, respect of their presence and activities, and reciprocal understanding of what 
needs to be done in order for the others to carry out whatever they are doing.
The negative effect of the industrial revolution was that for economic reasons equipment and 
machines brought in a person’s everyday life phenomena like noise and pollution. The dan-
ger of postindustrial and personalized media is for a person the loss of touch with public 
sense in favor of his/her own entertainment and fall into escapism: “Pokémon Go is a new 
distraction for drivers and pedestrians, and safety messages are scarce. Delayed reaction to 
mobile phone distractions has hampered public safety” [33] Deliberation is a character trait 
for anticipating these consequences between public rights and technological rights.
Social rules of public life are not only empirically tested but through their diachronic use they 
acquire their own historicity, and through that, public life introduces itself in our mind as a 
sheltered sphere of multiple activities where one can feel safe and respectable, independently 
of race, gender, taste of fashion, or social class. This historicity (of safety and respect), which is 
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based on public performances of social behavior, connects the existential to the public sphere 
in the most rhythmic manner possible and through that it achieves this transition with the 
less possible production of anxiety. Hence, sagacity (sunesis) through self-control represents a 
form of perceptiveness that would be able to understand the technical discontinuities caused 
by the epistemic gap between physical and virtual, terrestrial and aerial, and apprehend 
the anxious results this gap can motivate to a number of people that may bewilder or feel 
alienated by a senseless exercise of technological entertainment practices in public. Sagacity 
secures psychology of the public life from such events since it guarantees that existential and 
psychological factors are equally important with external social rules of behavior.
Cleverness (deinotis) is the first of the two enterprising intellectual skills and its role is to pro-
duce ways that based on the two previous trait virtues can ensure that both robotic and AR 
entertainment will be further developed and expanded. Cleverness with its inventive ethos 
is able to create new forms of crossroads between physical and virtual, terrestrial and aerial 
technologies, which will introduce this increasingly innovative and global practice through 
the public sphere via multiple interplays of activities and related themes in order to develop 
and organize the intensified interest for these technologies. It is crucial to understand clev-
erness as an extended continuation of the two aforementioned character virtues (delibera-
tion and sagacity), since without them, cleverness regarding these practices can easily turn 
through marketwise processes into merchandized services that by “exploiting” the epistemic 
gap and its social consequences create specialized environments either for AR games or for 
drone flights: “If a company decides to use Pokémon Go for developing a layer of commercially 
relevant interests, there is little in terms of conventional laws and regulations to stop them. 
This erodes the commons, and instrumentalizes for private profit a space originally open and 
regulated for the benefit of the many” [34]. When intellectual virtues like cleverness grow 
without character virtues that would assimilate the collision between different virtue motives 
(e.g., physical motive vs. virtual motive) as it has been discussed in the first section, then strict 
laws and merchant thinking are taking over, the first the safety of the social regularity and the 
second the “sheltered” defense of entertainment practices through the creation of correspond-
ing products and services.
Finally, judgment (gnomê) represents the completion of phronēsis, since it is in judgment where 
the accuracy or the weakness of a behavioral performance approximates or diverges from 
phronetic virtue. Through judgment, the three previous character traits and skills are exposing 
themselves as phronetic or aphronetic. The incidents, accidents, and concerns of the first two sec-
tions regarding AR technologies (i.e., Pokémon Go) and drone robotics can be described as the 
result of aphronetic, that is, imprudent approaches of technological uses in the public sphere. 
But what aphronetic means in practice is that one or more of the aforementioned traits or skills 
has not been adequately preformed or included in the phronetic process. Hence, even if there 
is a virtue motive in every technological performance that got in conflict with other (physical) 
motives in the social sphere, technical phronēsis has not been achieved in all these problematic 
cases: “Skills are teleological in that they have a goal or a purpose and the general principles 
of solving the problem of attaining goals are constituted as phronesis. Phronesis itself is not 
a skill, for it has no logos of its own. Rather, it is embodied within the logos of each skill” 
[35]. Hence, post-industrial phronēsis should be able, unlike traditional virtue epistemology 
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which is based entirely upon hypothetical arguments to clarify through technological praxis, 
that character traits like deliberation and sagacity facilitate intellectual skills in order for them 
to transform and become phronēsis: “Longterm, rigorously designed studies should look at 
mechanisms of effective Internet‐based interventions such as cooperation, competition, nos-
talgia, intermittent reinforcement, sense of control, and augmented reality” [36]. At the same 
time, character traits are also unable to distinguish as phronēsis by themselves unless they inter-
mingle with intellectual skills like cleverness and judgment.
Conclusively, the suggestion of this model for a post-industrial phronēsis used two different 
forms of virtue elements, the first two were character‐trait virtues and the second intellectual 
skills. I have described the first two as assimilative to the extent that they both include elements 
of perceptiveness of an environment which in this case is composed by social, psychological, 
and historical factors of behavior that needed to be understood by the appropriate character 
traits like deliberation and sagacity. This understanding, executed by these character traits, 
composes a field of knowledge, which is practical and social, and since the performances of 
both AR games and drones are public, knowing the field and the conditions that compose 
it is a prerequisite of the game rules. Therefore, public sphere and its corresponding savoir 
vivre and faire social rules should be seen as an essential part of the game/flight entertainment. 
But by being part of these processes and in order to be a virtuous player or pilot means to 
have knowledge of these rules and respond to this knowledge appropriately. When the lat-
ter occurs in technological processes of respatialization, post-industrial phronēsis takes place.
5. Technological epistemology and postindustrial intellect
By arguing epistemically about the ethical basis of “know how to play” and “know how to 
use,” virtue epistemology not only introduces present and future generations into an epis-
temic ethics of technological responsibility in a field of unexpected dangers and side effects 
but also updates our epistemological understanding by redefining the boundaries across 
which socially and ethically—but most important practically and thus functionally—philo-
sophical inquiry can draw the line between technological character and intellect liability on 
the one hand and technological irresponsibility and senselessness on the other (i.e., the sys-
tematic repetition of a mistaken savoir vivre and a mistaken savoir faire). Technology updates 
the conditions of living [37] and therefore the conditions of knowing and accordingly acting. 
Based on this fact, virtue epistemology is necessary, in order to create the epistemic basis of 
ethical conduct between technological order and conditions of living.
The argument of the third section attempted a synthesis of four supplementary virtues 
in Aristotle that I have used, by distinguishing them into character traits and intellectual 
traits. The argument suggested that each group of traits is unable by itself and solely by 
itself to formulate the virtue of phronēsis, but instead in order for this to be achieved, the 
two groups should associate in order for the assimilative traits to absorb the gap between 
physical and technological respatialization with responsibility, whereas the enterprising to 
achieve skill competition and develop further the technical characteristics of these new global 
Epistemology and Transformation of Knowledge in Global Age130
entertainments. This analysis, persuasively or not, has targeted to present a new possibility 
where virtues and postindustrial intellect can and should interweave in a world that does 
not go global and digital only materially but from within, where within means socially and 
anthropologically.
In such an internal transformation, daily and historical human phenomena and concepts such 
as friendship, workplace, love, society, university, and even the concept of truth are under 
alteration. Since all these concepts are related with one way or another with human intellect, 
it becomes necessary to examine what are the consequences of a post-industrial intellect that 
acts imprudently with (nano)technological strains that move from virtuality to reality and 
from terrestrial to aerial functions. In specific, one needs to consider how this intellect can 
be developed if virtue adoption fails: “The clear implication is that immersion in a vulgar, 
degrading mass culture cannot have any such effect. If anything, it is likely to have a brutal-
izing effect, making one more mean‐spirited, self‐indulgent, less open to loftier feelings, and 
hence less given to the pursuit of virtue” [38].
According to Bernard Stiegler: “To live in the extremely complex milieus that deploy this 
industrial and planetary technical system, a system capable of unleashing colossal power 
at any instant, requires of the people traversing them that they maintain a blind trust” [39]. 
There are at least two crucial factors that one has to underline in order to penetrate into a very 
possible dystopic scenario: the first one is the miniaturization of technicity via nanotechnol-
ogy and the second is the liquidation of ethics [39], through narcissism that expresses itself as 
total ignorance of applied virtues (stupidity) or in an even worse scenario as a disbelief in the 
value of virtues (cynicism).
Post‐industrial intellect suffers first and foremost ethically and then intellectually, to the extent 
that it fails to synthesize and then follow and perform in a virtuous order. Technological 
miniaturization of personalized technologies on the one hand and the globalization of narcis-
sism through videographic entertainment on the other disregard when they do not flirt with 
phenomena of stupidity, whereas they silently approve cynicism as a cultural extension and 
a necessary evil of a competitive lifestyle: “The technology to produce a destructive nano-
bot seems considerably easier to develop than the technology to create an effective defense 
against such an attack (a global nanotech immune system, an “active shield”. It is therefore 
likely that there will be a period of vulnerability during which this technology must be pre-
vented from coming into the wrong hands. Yet the technology could prove hard to regulate, 
since it does not require rare radioactive isotopes or large, easily identifiable manufacturing 
plants, as does production of nuclear weapons” [40]. Both Bostrom and Stiegler refer to dan-
gers, the first by highlighting miniaturization and the second narcissistic cynicism and stupid-
ity. The first analysis refers to long‐scale effects of an imprudent performance and the second 
to a short-scale daily basis behavior based on the lack of savoir vivre and faire.
Technical prudence and technological education go hand in hand and it is obvious that the late 
twentieth century’s educational systems did not manage to supervise what was to become the 
twenty‐first century cultural addiction, screengazing: the cultural phenomenon where com-
munication, observation, and human interaction are substituted by the digital videographic 
alphabet of Youtube and Facebook, “where most people are independently staring at their own 
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individual screens in parks” [41]. Repetitive senselessness regarding technological misuse, 
especially in the form of entertainment, that expresses itself intellectually either as stupidity or 
as cynicism represents the mental consequences of the screengaze phenomenon: “Screens are 
evolving at a speed that dwarfs the ability of the research community’s ability to follow their 
deleterious effects. Public health researchers, practitioners, and policy makers are left with 
two options: admit failure, or strive for adaptability when messaging to the public” [42]. Apart 
from that, there are biological reasons like “the limitation of our observation capacities to only 
one level at a time” [43], which need to be stretched as part of a postindustrial virtue epistemol-
ogy that can and should be developed further philosophically and incorporated in educational 
systems: “With the inevitable future growth in software that bridges the virtual world with the 
real world, guidelines to prevent potential adverse consequences should be arranged” [44].
6. Conclusions
The discussion about the possibilities of a post-industrial phronēsis, which is based on a 
technical prudence, composed by supplementary traits and skills concerns the present and 
the future use of daily personalized technologies in public space. The basic argument of 
the chapter was that AR games and the use of robotics in public while globalizing the local 
create objective dangers that emanate from processes of respatialization. In AR games, 
respatialization is taking the form of an interplay between virtual and actual, whereas in 
drones between terrestrial and aerial occupation and movement. That causes ethical and 
social consequences as a result of an epistemic gap, between physical spatialization and 
technical respatialization. The main difference from older forms of respatialization (cinema 
and airplane) lies in the representational and ontological intersection (AR games), and pri-
vate microtechnologies flights. Since both of them become digitally personalized, then the 
main argument of the chapter was that an ethical approach should be based upon a connec-
tion of virtue epistemology with post-industrial use of these technologies. In other words, 
that there must be a set of virtues that would correspond to the four basic components 
that would ensure the transition of a savoir vivre and a savoir faire, from physical to digital 
devices use and public behavior.
The latter would consist of (a) the bridging of social responsibility with public rights, (b) set-
ting up the ground through perceptiveness of public psychological factors such as anxiety 
caused by these uses, (c) ensuring responsibility while increasing skill competition and enthu-
siasm, and (d) setting and evaluating in practice the formation of a technical intellect from a 
moral and cognitive perspective. The argument proposed four components, two of which are 
assimilative character traits, like deliberation and sagacity, whereas the other two are enter-
prising intellectual skills like cleverness and judgment. The argument suggested that it is only 
through their mutual incorporation that a post-industrial phronēsis becomes achievable, since 
neither character traits nor intellectual skills are adequate for the completion of a phronetic 
process by themselves.
Finally, the chapter presented the view that imprudent or aphronetic performance multiplies 
the danger caused by miniaturization of devices leading to great catastrophes (long-scale 
effects of imprudent performances), or by narcissistic cynicism and stupidity leading to an 
insecure and disturbed public life by inappropriate practicing.
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